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LET’S MAKE IT A TRUE DAILY DOUBLE 
( JEOPARDY): HOW JAMES HARRISON WAS 
ACQUITTED OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
ONLY TO FACE IT AGAIN 
Abstract: On May 10, 2011, in Harrison v. Gillespie, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that defendants do not have a per se con-
stitutional right to poll the jury before a trial judge declares a mistrial. Fur-
ther, the court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a 
court from considering the death penalty as a potential sentence on re-
trial. This Comment argues, however, that in doing so, the court made it 
more likely that capital defendants will receive the death penalty, because a 
fresh jury may impose the death penalty, even though the previously dis-
charged jury merely deadlocked over which lesser included punishment to 
impose. 
Introduction 
 James Harrison was convicted of first-degree murder and faced the 
possibility of being sentenced to death.1 The penalty-phase jury, con-
fronted with whether Harrison deserved to die for what he had done, 
seemingly deadlocked on this issue.2 In its communications with the 
judge, the jury indicated that it could not agree on which lesser alter-
native punishment to impose, a fact which suggested that the ultimate 
punishment—death—was off the table.3 In response to this indication, 
Harrison asked that the judge poll the jury to confirm that it in fact 
had eliminated the death penalty from its deliberations.4 Rather than 
entertain this request, however, the trial judge summarily discharged 
the jury.5 
 Yet, monumental implications hinged on what—if anything—the 
jury had collectively decided prior to being discharged.6 If, on the one 
hand, the jury had rejected the death penalty, then the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause would bar the government from seeking capital punish-
                                                                                                                      
1 Harrison v. Gillespie (Harrison IV ), 640 F.3d 888, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
2 Id. at 893. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 894. 
6 Id. at 906. 
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ment against Harrison on retrial.7 On the other hand, if the jurors did 
not reach a final decision, then the prosecution would have a fresh op-
portunity to obtain a death sentence in the future.8 
 Part I of this Comment describes Harrison’s trial and traces his 
appeals through the legal system.9 Then, Part II explores acquittals as 
the hallmark of double jeopardy protections, and how a majority of the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the penalty-phase jury never acquitted 
Harrison of the death penalty for double jeopardy purposes.10 Part III 
discusses the discretionary power of trial judges to poll juries before 
discharging them and the risks inherent in that discretion.11 Finally, 
Part IV argues that the majority, by misunderstanding the purpose of 
capital sentencing proceedings, circumvented the Double Jeopardy 
Clause and rendered its protections inapplicable in a situation in which 
they are needed most.12 
I. Harrison’s Trial and Appeal 
 On November 21, 2006, a jury found James Harrison guilty of first-
degree murder in Nevada state court.13 At sentencing, however, when 
the State sought the death penalty, the jury deadlocked over what sen-
tence to impose.14 In response, Harrison requested that the judge poll 
the jury to determine whether the jury had unanimously rejected death 
as a potential punishment.15 Instead, after speaking with the foreper-
son, the judge concluded that the jury was at an impasse as to Harri-
son’s sentence, declared a mistrial, and discharged the jury without 
polling.16 
 After this discharge, the trial judge collected the verdict forms on 
which the jury was to record its determinations of fact and Harrison’s 
sentence.17 Upon examining the forms, the court noted that the jury 
                                                                                                                      
7 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”); Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 906. 
8 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 900–01 (stating that there was no “valid and final judg-
ment” that would preclude seeking the death penalty on retrial). 
9 See infra notes 13−45 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 46−63 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 64−76 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 77−96 and accompanying text. 
13 Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 893. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 893–94. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 894. 
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completed only two of the four forms.18 The two completed forms re-
vealed that the jury had found one aggravating factor and twenty-four 
mitigating factors.19 The remaining two forms were to be used to re-
cord Harrison’s sentence.20 If the jury determined that the sole aggra-
vating factor outweighed the mitigating factors, the first verdict form 
enabled it to choose between a fixed term of imprisonment, life with 
the possibility of parole, life without parole, or death.21 But, if the jury 
found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating 
circumstance, the second form allowed the jury to select a punishment 
of a fixed term of imprisonment, life with the possibility of parole, or 
life without parole—but not death.22 Unable to agree on the appropri-
ate punishment, the jury failed to complete either of these latter two 
forms and Harrison’s sentence remained undetermined.23 
 On retrial, approximately seven months later, Harrison filed a mo-
tion to prevent the prosecution from again seeking the death penalty.24 
Relying on affidavits from three former jurors, he alleged that the sen-
tencing-phase jury unanimously decided against applying the death 
penalty and had determined that the mitigating factors outweighed the 
aggravating factor.25 Therefore, he argued, the State should be barred 
from again seeking the death penalty.26 The trial court, however, de-
nied this motion as well as Harrison’s request to stay further penalty-
phase proceedings.27 Harrison subsequently petitioned the Nevada Su-
preme Court, again arguing that the juror affidavits demonstrated an 
unambiguous rejection of the death penalty.28 The Nevada Supreme 
Court issued a temporary stay of further penalty-phase proceedings, but 
ultimately, on September 7, 2007, denied Harrison’s petition and va-
cated the stay.29 
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. 
19 Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 894. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 894–95. 
22 See id. at 895. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 895. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 895–96. 
29 Id. at 896. 
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 On June 20, 2008, Harrison filed a habeas corpus petition in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, raising two arguments.30 
First, he argued that he should not be subject to the death penalty be-
cause the jury had unanimously concluded that the mitigating circum-
stances outweighed the aggravating circumstance.31 Second, he argued 
that the trial court had erred in declaring a mistrial without first polling 
the jurors to determine whether they had unanimously decided that 
the mitigators trumped the aggravator.32 With regards to his first con-
tention, the district court held that the partially completed jury verdict 
forms did not establish that the jury had determined that the mitigat-
ing factors outweighed the aggravating factor.33 It did not comment, 
however, on Harrison’s second contention that the trial had erred in its 
mistrial declaration.34 
 Harrison appealed this ruling to a panel of the Ninth Circuit, 
maintaining solely that the Nevada trial court erred in declaring a mis-
trial without first polling the jury to determine if it had collectively 
reached a verdict about the imposition of the death penalty.35 A merits 
panel of the Ninth Circuit stayed the pending state court proceedings 
and granted Harrison’s habeas petition.36 A majority of the active court 
judges then voted to rehear the case en banc.37 On rehearing en banc, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that jeopardy never attached to Harri-
son.38 Thus, the State remained free to seek the death penalty again on 
retrial.39 
 In reaching this outcome, the court held that there is no per se 
constitutional right to poll a penalty-phase jury about whether it had 
excluded death as a potential sentence.40 According to the court, such 
a right would engender two unacceptable risks.41 First, it might permit 
                                                                                                                      
30 Harrison v. Nevada (Harrison I ), No. 2:08-cv-00802-RCJ-RJJ, 2008 WL 2570925, at 
*1–2 (D. Nev. June 25, 2008), rev’d, 596 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d en banc, 640 F.3d 888 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
31 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 896. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Harrison v. Gillespie (Harrison II ), 596 F.3d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 
640 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2011). 
36 Id. at 575. 
37 Harrison v. Gillespie (Harrison III ), 608 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (voting to 
rehear the case en banc). 
38 Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 906. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 905–06. 
41 Id. at 906. 
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judicially coerced compromise verdicts.42 Second, it would allow de-
fendants to treat tentative, preliminary votes as irrevocable final ver-
dicts.43 Although the court held that such a right is not constitutionally 
required, judges have discretion to poll a jury to determine whether it 
has reached a partial verdict.44 Consequently, the majority held that the 
trial judge did not abuse her discretion, because the deadlocked jury 
did not indicate it excluded the death penalty as a possible sentence.45 
II. Acquittals as the Touchstone of Double Jeopardy 
Protections in Capital Sentencing Proceedings 
 Harrison based his request—to poll the jury prior to its dis-
charge—on the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause,46 which 
states that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”47 In theory, this principle pre-
vents the government, with its immense resources and power, from 
making repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged of-
fense.48 Multiple trials subject a defendant to prolonged embarrass-
ment, expense, and anxiety, and increase the likelihood of an errone-
ous conviction.49 In 1981, In Bullington v. Missouri, the U.S. Supreme 
Court extended the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause.50 It did so by 
holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to capital sentencing 
proceedings because those proceedings resemble a trial on the mer-
its.51 Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution not only 
from making repeated attempts to prove a defendant’s guilt, but also 
from making repeated attempts at securing a death sentence.52 
                                                                                                                     
 The gravamen for triggering the constitutional double jeopardy 
protection is whether there has been an acquittal.53 Acquittals can be 
either express or implied.54 An express acquittal occurs when the jury 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 906. 
45 Id. 
46 Harrison v. Gillespie (Harrison IV ), 640 F.3d 888, 901 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
47 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
48 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
49 Id. at 187–88. 
50 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981). 
51 Id. 
52 See id. 
53 See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003). 
54 Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 898. 
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returns a verdict in the accused’s favor.55 An implied acquittal occurs 
when a jury fails to convict on a greater charge but instead reaches a 
verdict on a lesser included offense.56 
 For Fifth Amendment protections to attach to a failure to convict, 
the defendant must provide explicit factual findings that the govern-
ment failed to prove the existence of aggravating factors beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.57 For example, in 2003, in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, the 
Supreme Court held that a life sentence—imposed by statute when the 
jury deadlocked—did not constitute an acquittal for double jeopardy 
purposes.58 Because the jury failed to make any findings with respect to 
the alleged aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the default life 
sentence judgment under Pennsylvania law did not implicate the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause on retrial.59 
 Furthermore, incomplete or improperly completed jury forms are 
not sufficiently final to attach the Double Jeopardy Clause.60 In Harri-
son, for instance, the completed jury forms did not address whether the 
jury found that the mitigating factors outweighed the sole aggravating 
factor.61 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the jury never 
reached a “valid and final judgment” equivalent to an acquittal for 
Double Jeopardy purposes.62 Absent a complete and definite decision 
concerning Harrison’s sentence, there could be no acquittal.63 
III. Jury Polling as a Matter of Judicial Discretion 
 Harrison conceded that the partially completed jury forms did not 
amount to a partial verdict in his favor.64 Nevertheless, he argued that 
the judge should have polled the jury prior to its discharge to deter-
mine whether it had unanimously rejected the death penalty.65 If it 
had, the Double Jeopardy Clause would preclude the state from seek-
ing the death penalty again on retrial.66 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 110. 
58 Id. at 109. 
59 Id. at 109−10. 
60 See id. at 110; Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 900. 
61 Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 900. 
62 See id. at 900–01. 
63 Id. 
64 Harrison v. Gillespie (Harrison IV ), 640 F.3d 888, 901 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
65 Id. at 901. 
66 Id. 
2012 Harrison and Double Jeopardy 153 
 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and held that a judge is not 
constitutionally required to inquire into a jury’s preliminary determi-
nations before that judge declares a mistrial and discharges the jury.67 
Instead, the court concluded that the decision to conduct a jury poll is 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge.68 It did so, in part, 
by reasoning that the Supreme Court has never required a trial judge 
to mechanically follow particular devices or procedures before declar-
ing a mistrial based on juror deadlock.69 
 Two primary rationales informed the Harrison majority’s decision 
to affirm the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in not polling the jury: 
the potential for judicial coercion and the lack of finality of preliminary 
determinations.70 First, the judge, in attempting to break a deadlock 
through a mid-deliberation inquiry, may subtly appear to side with one 
of the factions in a hung jury.71 This intervention may improperly per-
suade the jury and provide the appearance that the judge, and there-
fore the law itself, favors one side over the other.72 Second, mid-
deliberation inquiry into a jury’s preliminary determinations runs the 
risk of causing provisional votes to hastily solidify into final decisions.73 
Such premature calcification of juror viewpoints precludes the oppor-
tunity for new insights or opinions about the case through continued 
deliberation.74 Therefore, the majority in Harrison reasoned that only a 
unanimous, final decision, announced in open court can ensure accu-
rate and true verdicts.75 Presumably cognizant of these unacceptable 
legal ramifications, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial judge had 
exercised sound discretion in deciding not to poll the jury about 
whether it had eliminated the death penalty for double jeopardy pur-
poses.76 
                                                                                                                      
67 See id. at 902. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 905 (citing Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010) (holding that a trial 
judge is not required to compel the jury to continue to deliberate, to question jurors indi-
vidually, or consider particular means of breaking an impasse)). 
70 640 F.3d at 902. 
71 Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 Yale L.J. 100, 137 (1968). 
72 See id. 
73 Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 903. 
74 Id. at 903–04. 
75 Id. at 904. 
76 See id. at 906. 
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IV. A Confused Characterization of Capital  
Sentencing Hearings 
 The Harrison majority undermined Harrison’s right to be free 
from Double Jeopardy by misunderstanding the appropriate function 
of capital sentencing proceedings.77 The majority emphasized the role 
of capital sentencing proceedings as driven by a need to arrive at a fi-
nal, valid verdict.78 Yet, by engaging in an extended discussion of the 
role of acquittals and verdicts, it failed to consider whether the jury had 
eliminated the death penalty from its deliberations.79 Focusing on this 
narrow issue would have vindicated, not undermined, Harrison’s Fifth 
Amendment right to know whether he was eligible for the death pen-
alty in a subsequent retrial.80 
 The majority abrogated and minimized the longstanding protec-
tions of the Double Jeopardy Clause by engaging in a technical analysis 
of what constituted a verdict.81 In dismissing the jury without asking 
whether it had unanimously rejected the death penalty, the trial judge 
failed to recognize the unique nature of the death penalty as well as the 
fundamental role of the capital-sentencing phase.82 Polling the penalty-
phase jury may have revealed the jury’s unanimous rejection of the 
death penalty for Harrison.83 Although the jury deadlocked over Harri-
son’s ultimate sentence,84 it may have unanimously concluded that the 
death penalty was an inappropriate sentence.85 Had the trial judge 
polled the jury to ascertain this likely acquittal of the death penalty, 
Harrison could have received a final (if partial) verdict that the prose-
cution did not prove that the aggravator outweighed the mitigators be-
                                                                                                                      
77 See Harrison v. Gillespie (Harrison IV ), 640 F.3d 888, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who 
Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsi-
bility, 57 Hastings L.J. 693, 729 (2006). 
78 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 893. 
79 See id. at 897−901; id. at 914 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Williams, supra note 77, at 
729. 
80 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 914 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
81 See id. at 897–901. But cf. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003) (ex-
plaining that an acquittal is the sole relevant issue in Double Jeopardy analysis). 
82 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 916 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Jeffrey Abramson, Death-
Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 117, 118 
(2004); Marcia A. Widder, Comment, Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the 
Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1341, 1374 
(1994). 
83 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 894, 905. 
84 Id. at 893. 
85 Id. at 917 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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yond a reasonable doubt.86 Confirmation by means of a jury poll that 
the state failed to prove Harrison’s death-eligibility would have pro-
tected Harrison from the prospect of the death penalty again on retrial 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.87 
 The high stakes of capital sentencing proceedings underscore the 
vast ramifications of the majority’s failure to focus on the function that 
these proceedings serve.88 Because death, as punishment, is different 
from all others, it requires different treatment.89 As such, extra precau-
tions exist to ensure that a punishment unique in its severity and irrevo-
cability is limited in its application and fairly administered when appro-
priate.90 Informed by both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the 
Supreme Court required separate capital sentencing proceedings for 
determining a defendant’s death-eligibility as a procedural mechanism 
for limiting the then-existing arbitrary state death penalty schemes.91 
 In appreciating the unique and severe nature of the death penalty, 
Nevada has itself recognized that its capital sentencing hearings exist 
for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is death-eligible.92 
Contrary to the majority decision in Harrison, capital sentencing pro-
ceedings do not exist simply to decide what actual sentence should be 
imposed after the jury decides the defendant is not death eligible.93 
Nevada law supports the dissent’s characterization of the role of sen-
tencing hearings, and permits the trial judge, faced with a jury dead-
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. at 914 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 917 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); see Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amend-
ment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 771, 779 (2005). 
88 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 
(1976); Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 917 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
89 Abramson, supra note 82, at 118. 
90 Id. at 118–19; Hoeffel, supra note 87, at 810. 
91 See Zant, 462 U.S. at 876; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187; Abramson, supra note 82, at 118 
(explaining how, among other things, bifurcated trials helped mitigate against the arbi-
trariness and capriciousness in existing death penalty schemes that violated the Eighth 
Amendment). 
92 See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.556 (2011) (explaining that in a capital case, a jury verdict 
is not required for a life without parole sentence but can be imposed by a judge when the 
jury fails to decide upon a sentence); Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 916 (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
ing); Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (noting that the state implemented separate 
capital sentencing proceedings in capital cases for the specific purpose of genuinely nar-
rowing the class of death-eligible offenders); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guid-
ed Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1151, 
1152 (2003). 
93 Zant, 462 U.S. at 876 (holding that aggravating circumstances must narrow the field 
of persons eligible for the death penalty); see Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 916 (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting); Hollaway, 6 P.3d at 996 (explaining that capital sentencing proceeds exist to 
narrow potential death-eligible offenders). 
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locked over the appropriate sentence, to enter a sentence of life with-
out parole.94 It logically follows that because a non-capital sentence 
may be imposed without a jury verdict, the primary concern of Nevada 
capital sentencing hearings cannot be to arrive at a final sentence, after 
death is eliminated.95 Giving a judge this power reveals that the jury 
fulfills its constitutional role after it resolves the paramount question of 
death eligibility.96 
 Recognition that death is different required states to institute 
separate procedural tools to ensure that capital punishment schemes 
passed constitutional muster.97 Thus, contrary to the majority holding, 
the trial judge arguably committed constitutional error by not polling a 
soon-to-be discharged jury that had indicated its probable unanimous 
rejection of the death penalty.98 Failure to do so may have circum-
vented Harrison’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause and al-
lowed his likely acquittal of the death penalty to leave the courthouse 
with his jury.99 
Conclusion 
 In Harrison, the en banc Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by declining to poll the discharged 
jury to determine whether the jury had excluded the death penalty as a 
potential sentence. The court did so by holding that a defendant does 
not have a per se constitutional right to poll a jury. Thus, under this 
reasoning, the trial judge exercised sound discretion by dismissing the 
deadlocked jury. In coming to this conclusion, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit disregarded the uniqueness of the death penalty and the addi-
tional constitutional safeguards it requires. 
 By denying the capital defendant the opportunity to poll the dis-
charged jury, the Harrison majority arguably circumvented the Double 
Jeopardy Clause and allowed the prosecution multiple opportunities to 
secure a death sentence. Although the jury deadlocked on which sen-
tence to impose, it likely dismissed the death penalty as a possible sen-
tence. Jeopardy would have attached to the partial death penalty ruling 
and barred the state from seeking it upon retrial. Thus, jury polling 
comports with the explicit function of capital sentencing proceedings: 
                                                                                                                      
94 See § 175.556. 
95 See id.; Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 916 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
96 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 916 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
97 See Abramson, supra note 82, at 118. 
98 See Harrison IV, 640 F.3d at 906 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
99 See id. 
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narrowing the pool of death eligible offenders. Thus, even though the 
jury could not decide on which sentence to impose, it likely decided 
against the death penalty. Only a polling of the jury prior to discharg-
ing it could have unearthed this decision. 
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